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Instrumentation and electrical (I&E) maintenance is typically managed using site-wide policies, 
practices, and procedures. Since I&E equipment is part of the control system and nearly every 
other layer of protection, the cumulative impact of poor I&E performance can be a significant 
contributor to major events. Systemic problems in managing I&E equipment reliability lowers 
process safety performance across a site.  
Practical guidance is needed on how to assess the vulnerability of existing sites to instrumented 
safeguard failure due to maintenance deficits. This paper leverages Reason’s organizational 
accident model as a framework to discuss site-specific factors that impact a site’s susceptibility to 
maintenance error. A table of more than 60 human factors covering I&E maintenance activities 
was developed and organized by 4 elements of causality: organizational processes, workplace 
practices, personnel traits, and enabling conditions. The human factors table can be used to rate an 
industrial site on a negative-to-positive scale, highlighting those areas where systemic changes 
would likely improve maintenance performance and instrument reliability.  
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1 Leading or Lagging Indicators 
The process industry depends on I&E equipment maintained in a manner that sustains the 
equipment’s ability to act as required, when required, to prevent process safety incidents. While 
this responsibility is mandated by process safety regulations, it is simply a wise business practice 
to be proactive in managing instrument reliability. At many facilities, any one of thousands of 
instruments could cause operational problems. High reliability organizations understand that 
tackling these challenges head-on yields the best process availability. 
Yet, assessments conducted by the UK’s Health and Safety Executive (HSE) [1] and the US’s 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) [2, 3] have found that some companies 
in the process sector have problems with their maintenance programs, as evidenced by the 
percentage of maintenance-related findings (Figure 1). These findings echo those published as a 
series of case studies in Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes (Safe Automation) 
[4]. 
 
Figure 1. HSE Incident Analysis [1], OSHA Refinery National Emphasis Program 
(NEP) [2], and OSHA Chemical NEP [3] Findings 
Government and industrial organizations have recommended metrics for monitoring the 
effectiveness of process safety management, including the Health and Safety Executive [5] the 
Center for Chemical Process Safety [6], and the American Petroleum Institute.  API 754 [7] 
established 4 tiers of indicators (Figure 2). The bottom 2 tiers are leading indicators, because they 
are measures of the operating discipline, equipment integrity and safety culture. When these tiers 
are well-managed, it is far less likely that an event will happen. Safe Automation’s case studies 
show that the top 2 tiers are often events where Tier 3 and 4 metrics were not implemented, and 
site practices did not identify and correct systemic problems. 
 
Figure 2 API 754 Metrics 
 
International standards on instrumented safeguards provide more detailed guidance on 
performance metrics. ISA 61511 [8] requires monitoring the safety instrumented system (SIS) 
reliability parameters, which are Tier 3 metrics. Quite a few more Tier 3 metrics are recommended 
by ISA TR84.00.04 in Annex R [9]. Tier 4 indicators, such as using maintenance records as a 
predictive tool for reliability issues, were introduced into the 2012 edition of ISA TR84.00.03 [10] 
on asset integrity management of SIS. Recent ISA 84 meetings have included workshops on 
reducing systematic errors during SIS implementation and discussions on preventing systematic 
errors during maintenance.  
2 Incidents are an Organization Failure 
Human factors often play an out-sized role in poor I&E reliability. Safe Automation’s case studies 
demonstrated strong links between the incidents and the failure to manage the on-going reliability 
of instrumentation and controls [4, 11]. These incidents ultimately were attributed to a series of 
failures that lined up in a dangerous manner. To prevent incidents, effort is required to sustain the 
asset integrity of the site’s I/E equipment [12]. The errors, violations, and systemic failures in one 
system, whether control or safety, often repeat in other instrumented systems. If SIS equipment is 
not maintained, it is highly likely that other I/E reliability deviations are occurring. Systematic 
issues in maintenance can easily cause a breakdown of multiple IPLs (Independent Protection 
Layers), even if the IPLs are deemed independent based on an analysis of the equipment and 
system architecture [13].  
The latest industry-published guidance on reducing maintenance errors through diversity is not 
really helpful. While theoretically attractive, there is no evidence that equipment diversity, 
staggered testing, or diverse maintenance teams can address the predominant underlying problems 
that are frequently cited by I&E technicians (Table 1). Rather, the proposed diversity would tend 
to make many field issues worse by increasing the complexity of the design, installation, testing, 
and maintenance.  
Table 1 Problems commonly cited by I&E Technicians [13]  
Unclear roles and responsibilities Poor procedures 
Lack of up-to-date documentation Lack of warnings or cautions 
Poor planning Poor installation and configuration 
 
3 A Practical Approach to Determining Site Risk for Systematic 
Error 
James Reason, the father of the accident causation model, also known as the “swiss cheese” model, 
stated “Blaming people for their error is emotionally satisfying but remedially useless [14].” Errors 
are not inherently bad. There are a multitude of industry stories of errors that birthed significant 
innovations.  
Errors can be made by the best people. No one intends to make them. The more competent the 
person is, the more likely they will commit a very serious error. This is because the most competent 
people will seek out assignments with the greatest challenges and risk. All employees should be 
competent enough to do at least the average job, so error management is not equivalent to 
competency management. Rather, error management is about understanding what promotes errors 
and changing the situation presented to the employee to discourage them instead.  
 
Figure 3 Errors Involve A Mental State and A Situation  
Errors are affected by the mental state of the individual and the situation presented to the individual 
(Figure 3). Functional safety principles cannot control the individual’s mental state, but they can 
influence the individual’s decision-making processes. Everyone weighs the costs versus the 
benefits of complying to policies, procedures, and practices (Figure 4).  
 
Figure 4 Humans Balance Costs and Benefits When Making Decisions 
The perceived costs might include accidents, injuries, and damages, but these may seem like 
unlikely future events compared to the benefits of doing something an easier way or saving time 
today. In most cases of non-compliance, the benefits are easy to see immediately with little obvious 
negative impact.  
The cost/benefit balance is rarely shifted by increasing the penalties for non-compliance, because 
these penalties are already known to be severe in the case of process safety events. Instead, greater 
influence on decision-making might be achieved by investing more time in acknowledging the 
important benefits of compliance. 
In contrast to the mental state, the situation can be controlled and managed by functional safety 
management. The situation can be viewed as what maintenance personnel face when executing the 
work. The situation involves 4 elements: organizational processes, workplace practices, personnel 
traits and enabling conditions (Figure 5).  
 
Figure 5 Situations Involve 4 Elements 
These elements are external to personnel, but they influence the decision-making process. The 
situation can vary significantly in ways that promote or discourage human error. For example, the 
situation could involve a task that is well-planned with detailed procedures in place to achieve 
quality work execution. Or the situation could involve troubleshooting unexpected behavior with 
unfamiliar technology in a poorly lit room with no up-to-date specification. 
Reason’s organizational accident model (Figure 6) used the 4 elements to illustrate the underlying 
causality [14] of human errors and incidents. Errors occur when a planned action does not achieve 
the desired result. For example, the maintenance procedure did not define who takes responsibility 
for the equipment being returned to service, so this critical task was not done. In contrast, violations 
occur when deviations from an approved practice are intentionally taken.  
Violations are rarely malicious acts and are often intended as positive with respect to some aspect 
of the task. An optimizing violation occurs when someone does something that seems to 
accomplish the same thing but is easier or faster than the planned way. For example, the deviation 
meets the deadline or budget, demonstrates a high level of skill, or is simply easier. Routine or 
optimizing violations can become part of the site maintenance culture when an owner/operator 
rarely punishes deviations or fails to frequently reward compliance [15].  
 
Figure 6 Anatomy of an Organizational Accident (adapted from [14]) 
Organizational processes focus worker attention on certain behaviors and metrics, while workplace 
practices impact the quality and consistency by which maintenance activities are accomplished. 
Organizational processes determine what is considered important or not. These processes feed into 
management decisions that directly impact the day-to-day work of planning, forecasting, 
budgeting, communicating, monitoring, and auditing. Many accidents begin with negative 
organizational processes that promote poor workplace practices and tolerance of poor instrument 
reliability. For example, effective communication between maintenance and engineering is critical 
to ensure that reliability issues are addressed comprehensively. The likelihood of unresolved, long-
term reliability problems significantly increases when communication breaks down between 
engineering, operations, and maintenance.  
Workplace practices are the written instructions that govern how maintenance is executed. Poor 
practices, like inadequate instructions, missing specifications, obsolete procedures, and ineffective 
interface design, increase the likelihood of errors and violations [16]. For example, a test procedure 
that does not define the required equipment function becomes a source for maintenance error even 
though the maintenance person has a high degree of skill with the technology.  
Personnel traits are intrinsic to the person executing the task. The most important traits are 
possessing the skills and experience necessary to complete assigned tasks correctly. Hiring 
competent personnel is essential but sustaining competency as I&E technology changes can be 
challenging. High turnover can make it difficult to ensure that personnel have the in-depth 
knowledge of the system design needed for troubleshooting problems or evaluating the impact of 
management of change activities. Competency can also be off-set when fatigue or poor health 
impacts decision-making. Accidents become even more likely when poor workplace practices are 
combined with negative personnel traits, such as inexperience, poor skills, or being tired.  
Enabling conditions make errors impacting multiple protection layers more likely. These 
conditions are triggered by organizational decisions that promote errors and violations, such as 
high work load, time pressure, unreasonable schedules, poor housekeeping, and poor quality tools. 
Other task-specific conditions, such as ill-fitting personal protective equipment, dim lighting, poor 
housekeeping and missing labeling can also exist due to management policies and resource 
allocations. These enabling conditions potentially increase the likelihood that error will occur 
regardless of how optimal the organizational processes and workplace practices may be. 
The 4 Elements of Causality were used as a framework to develop a list of 61 positive and negative 
human factors for maintenance activities. The list is based on personal experience and was 
enhanced by lessons-learned discussions at the Instrument Reliability Network [17], ISA 84 and 
ISA 61511 committee meetings. A summary of the systematic error sources, subtopics and human 
factors is provided in Table 2.  The detailed human factors table is provided in Appendix A.   
Table 2.     Hierarchy of Human Factors in Maintenance  





 Clarity of responsibilities 
 Engineering and maintenance communications 
 Operations and maintenance communications 
 Teamwork and communications 




 Process demand tracking  
 Maintenance priority 
 Out of service/bypass management 





 Task complexity 
 Procedure clarity and detail 
 Return to service procedures 
 Change management 
 Quality control and record keeping 
Maintenance 
Equipment/Interfaces 
 Specification and installation drawing 
availability 





General  Knowledge, skills and experience 
 Fatigue 
Competency Assessments  Verification of knowledge and skills 
Enabling 
Conditions 
General  Personal protective equipment 
 Tools and equipment 
 Working conditions 
 Housekeeping 
 Time pressure 
 
Each human factor listed in Table 2 has multiple prompts in Appendix A. These prompts describe 
negative and positive human factor attributes. Some negative organizational attributes often cited 
in incident reports are as follows: 
 Instrumented safeguard maintenance is frequently delayed, behind schedule, or not 
prioritized. 
 Frequent bypassing of instrumented safeguards with little oversight, time limits, or 
risk assessment. Bypasses include operator bypasses, manual operation, changing 
setpoints, and forces. 
 High tolerance for poor process control and upsets leading to frequent demands on the 
instrumented safeguards. 
 High tolerance for poor instrument reliability. Unresolved issues, long-term out-
service, and frequent fault conditions accepted. 
In contrast, the positive organizational attributes associated with these are: 
 Instrumented safeguard maintenance is prioritized, executed as scheduled, and is 
rarely delayed for operational reasons. 
 Instrumented safeguards only bypassed under strict controls, including compensating 
measures and time limits. Bypasses include operator bypasses, manual operation, 
changing setpoints, and forces. 
 Low tolerance for poor instrument reliability. Proactive attitude to taking action to 
improve reliability. 
 Low tolerance for poor process control; particular focus on reducing frequency of 
process upsets and process demands on the instrumented safeguards. 
The attributes can be rated on any desired scale. This paper takes a binary approach where the site 
is assessed as displaying either negative or positive human factors. Another approach is to use an 
analog scale of 1 to 5 with 1 being mostly negative and 5 being the mostly positive. The intent is 
to provide a means to assess the current status of the strategies, processes and activities used by a 
site to identify and prevent systematic errors.  
4 Applying Human Factors Evaluation to a Case Study 
Process safety management provides multiple opportunities to assess the adequacy of I&E 
equipment, including hazards and risk analysis, risk assessments, maintenance monitoring, 
management of change, and audits. The use of the positive and negative human factor table in 
Appendix A can be triggered as a result of findings from these activities. Using the table as part of 
a corrective process is a good way to get started and to demonstrate immediate benefits. However, 
it does mean that the site is already experiencing sufficient systemic impact to warrant a deeper 
dive. This is a classic feedback, or lagging indicator, approach to process safety [16]. Another 
approach would be to use the table as a self-assessment tool to understand site vulnerability to 
maintenance error before negative performance data piles up. 
To illustrate the methodology, the human factors table was applied to the incident commonly 
known as “Buncefield.” The incident occurred at the Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, which 
was located in Hemel Hempstead north of London England and was part of a complex of tank 
terminals known as the Buncefield Depot. The depot had an estimated capacity of 60 million 
gallons, making it the 5th largest oil depot in the UK [18]. The depot served as a major distribution 
center for the UK oil pipeline network [18]. It provided fuel to Humberside, Merseyside, as well 
as to Heathrow and Gatwick airports [19].  
An explosion occurred on December 11, 2005, which injured 43 people and devastated the 
Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal, which was jointly owned by Total UK Ltd and Chevron Ltd 
[19]. Residences and commercial buildings in the area were structurally damaged with some 
requiring demolition. The economic impact on regional businesses is estimated to be in the range 
of ₤130–170 million [19]. Total losses may have been as much as ₤1 billion [19, 20]. 
The incident occurred when the Automated Tank Gauging (ATG) system for one of the terminal 
tanks failed (Figure 7). The loss of level control allowed fuel to be fed into the tank for 11 hours 
[21]. The fuel overflowed through the tank conservation vents for approximately 40 minutes [22] 
prior to ignition, producing a large vapor cloud estimated to be 8 hectares in size [23]. The vapor 
cloud ignition resulted in the largest peacetime explosion in European history [18] producing a 
tremor measuring 2.4 on the Richter scale and blowing out windows five miles away from the site 
[23]. 
 
Figure 7. Simplified Graphic of Buncefield Tank 
Gasoline was being delivered to the tank on the day before the incident. Early the next morning, 
the ATG displayed an unchanging level, although the tank continued to fill. By practice, the 
operator controlled the tank level by terminating transfer upon receipt of the ‘user’ alarm. 
However, the 'user', 'high', and 'high high' level alarms used the same transmitter. The failure of 
the shared transmitter rendered all three alarms inoperative. Since the ‘user’ alarm never activated, 
the operator did not take action to terminate transfer.  
An independent high-level switch, set above the ATG high-high level, was designed to close inlet 
valves and activate an audible alarm, but it also failed. The high-level switch had been disabled 
when the maintenance organization, due to lack of understanding of the relatively new technology 
and to insufficiently detailed procedures, did not reinstall a lock on the switch test arm. Without 
the lock, the level switch was not activated when the float was lifted. By late afternoon, the tank 
overfilled and contents spilled out of tank roof vents. A vapor cloud was formed and noticed by 
tanker drivers and by people outside the facility. The fire alarm was activated and firewater pumps 
were started. An explosion occurred a short time later, likely ignited by the startup of the firewater 
pumps.  
Reviews of the readily available literature on the incident identified significant problems with I&E 
equipment. The analog level involved in the incident had 14 dangerous failures (stuck) in the 3.5 
months preceding the incident. It appears that the site had a high tolerance for poor process control 
and poor instrument reliability. The three “failed” alarm measurements came from the same faulty 
level device, which is an example of a common cause failure for the intended protection layers. 
The review also identified quite a few organizational and workplace issues: 
 Confusion of responsibilities and expectations 
 Poor communication between operations and maintenance 
 Lack of consistency on who did what and when 
 Lack of timely communication between maintenance technicians and supervision 
 No reporting structure for escalation of unresolved problems 
 Inaccessible installation drawings, specifications, and functional requirements 
 No review of installation and configuration of instrumented safeguards after initial 
validation 
The available information in reports on the Buncefield incident were used to assess the site against 
the human factors in Appendix A. Nearly half (28 of the 61) of the negative attributes were 
identified. It is also likely that other negative attributes were present; however, these contributors 
are not discussed in the available literature. The assessment suggests that the organizational 
processes, workplace practices, personnel traits, and enabling conditions at the Buncefield site 
significantly increased the likelihood of systematic issues. The negative human factors made an 
overfill event much more likely than would have been predicted by hazards and risk analysis. 
5 Summary 
Safe Automation’s case studies describe incidents where instrumented safeguards should have 
intervened in the incident propagation but did not. The underlying causes of these failures were 
often systematic rather than random. These underlying causes likely impacted the potential for 
incidents across the site, and perhaps the entire organization. A practical first step in preventing 
systematic error in instrumented safeguard maintenance can be to perform a qualitative evaluation 
of the existing maintenance human factors. This evaluation identifies the areas in which the 
organization might be vulnerable to such errors and where there might be more value to focusing 
additional organizational resources. A table of positive and negative human factors was created to 
allow assessment of a site’s vulnerability to systematic errors during maintenance. As an 
illustration, the table was used to assess the Buncefield incident.  Based on the published reports, 
nearly half of the 60 negative human factors were present. 
6 References    
[1] HSE, Health and safety laboratory report, Loss of Containment Incident Analysis, Great 
Britain (2003). 
[2] OSHA, Process Safety Management for Petroleum Refineries - Lessons Learned from the 
Petroleum Refinery Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program.  
[3] OSHA, Process Safety Management for Chemical Plants - Lessons Learned from the Chemical 
Process Safety Management National Emphasis Program. 
[4] CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Safe Automation of Chemical Processes, Second Edition, 
American Institute of Chemical Engineers, NY, (2017). 
[5] Health and Safety Executive, “Developing process safety indicators,” 1st edition, (2006) ISBN 
978 0 7176 6180 0. 
[6] CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Process Safety Metrics, Wiley-Interscience, New York (2009). 
[7] API, Recommended Practice Process Safety Performance Indicators for the Refining and 
Petrochemical Industries, RP754, API, Washington D.C. (2016). 
[8] ISA, ANSI/ISA 61511-1-2018, Functional Safety: Safety Instrumented Systems for the 
Process Industry Sector - Part 1: Framework, Definitions, System, Hardware and Application 
Programming Requirements (IEC 61511-1:2016+AMD1:2017 CSV, IDT), Research Triangle 
Park, NC (2018). 
[9] ISA, Guidelines for the Implementation of ANSI/ISA 84.00.01- Part 1, TR84.00.04-2015, 
Research Triangle Park, ISA, (2015).  
[10] ISA, Asset Integrity of Safety Instrumented Systems, TR84.00.03-20012, Research Triangle 
Park, ISA, (2015).  
[11] Summers, Angela, E. Roche, H. Jin, M. Carter, “Incidents That Define Safe Automation,” 
61st International Instrumentation Symposium, Huntsville Alabama, May 2015.  
[12] Summers, Angela, “Risk Assessment Challenges to 20:20 Vision,” Process Safety Progress, 
pages 119-125, June 2015.  
[13] Summers, Angela E. and Eloise Roche, “Mobile Interfaces on the Plant Floor,” 73rd 
Instrumentation and Automation Symposium, Texas A&M University, January 2018. 
[14] Reason, James and Alan Hobbs, Managing Maintenance Error: A Practical Guide, Ashgate 
Publishing Company, Hampshire England (2003). 
[15] Reason, James, Managing the Risks of Organizational Accidents, Ashgate Publishing 
Company, Hampshire England (1997).  
[16] CCPS/AIChE, Guidelines for Safe and Reliability Instrumented Protective Systems, 1st 
edition, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, NY, (2014). 
[17] Instrument Reliability Network, Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center, Texas A&M 
University. 
[18] Wikipedia, “2005 Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal Fire,” 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2005_Hertfordshire_Oil_Storage_Terminal_fire. 
[19] Buncefield Major Incident Investigation Board, “The Buncefield Incident 11 December 
2005: The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board,” ISBN 978 0 7176 6270 8, 
(2008). 
[20] British Broadcasting Station, “Buncefield blast could cost ₤1 bn,” December 11, 2008, 
United Kingdom, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/7777539.stm. 
[21] British Broadcasting Station, “Buncefield tank was overflowing,” May 9, 2006, United 
Kingdom, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4752819.stm. 
[22] The Daily Mail, “Petrol tank ‘overflowing’ before Buncefield blast,” May 9, 2006, United 
Kingdom, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-385607/Petrol-tank-overflowing-
Buncefield-blast.html 




Appendix A - 4 Elements of Causality 
 
 
Table 1. Organizational Processes 
 




Expectations communicated and rules are consistently 
enforced 





Clear communication between maintenance technicians 
and engineering to resolve instrumented safeguard 
issues 
Maintenance lacks support from engineering; 
tolerance for unresolved instrumented 
safeguard issues 
Timely communication of negative findings by 
maintenance to I&E engineering/reliability 
Poor or lack of communication of negative 





Clear communication of instrumented safeguard status 
between operations and maintenance technicians 
Poor/unclear communication of instrumented 
safeguard status between operations and 
maintenance technicians 
Reliable operator-to-maintenance technician 
communication equipment (two-way radios, telephone, 
etc.) with alternative means 
Unreliable, no alternative, may not work in an 
overloaded situation 
Good communication between operations and 
maintenance technicians 
No/not expected communication between 
operations and maintenance technicians 
Teamwork and 
communications 
Formal communication with turnover log when 
maintenance shift changes occur. Includes 
communication of active bypasses, overrides, faulted 
devices, and other issues relevant to safe completion of 
tasks. 
Informal communication when shift changes 
occur. No defined expectation on what to 
communicate at shift change. 
Frequent supervisory reviews and quality assurance 
checks 
No/incomplete supervisory reviews or quality 
assurance checks 
Good communication of new findings related to 
instrumented safeguard health, such as obsolescence, 
end-of-life, and any identified installation, 
commissioning, or functional issues 
Lack of timely communication of new findings 
related to instrumented safeguard health, so that 
identified issues are not addressed 
systematically across a site 
Routine reporting of repeat failures (e.g., bad actors) to 
maintenance supervision 
Lack of timely communication of repeat 
failures to maintenance supervision 
Emergency 
communications 
Clear, unambiguous site-wide emergency warning 
system 
No distinction in emergency warnings based on 
areas or event types.  Not audible or reliable in 
some locations. 
Instrument Reliability Program 
Process demand 
tracking 
Low tolerance for poor process control; particular 
focus on reducing frequency of process upsets and 
process demands on the instrumented safeguards 
High tolerance for poor process control and 





Maintenance priority is established based on device 
criticality and level of functional impairment 
Maintenance priority does not consider device 
criticality; redundant instrumented safeguard 
equipment essentially treated as "spares;" level 
of functional impairment not understood 
Spare parts management program considers the time 
required to acquire specialized instrumented safeguard 
equipment and the need to remain within the assumed 
mean time to restoration 
Spare parts purchased on failure detection 
without regard to lead time and planned mean 
time to restoration 
Instrumented safeguard maintenance is prioritized, 
executed as scheduled, and is rarely delayed for 
operational reasons 
Instrumented safeguard maintenance is 
frequently delayed, behind schedule, or not 
prioritized 
Instrumented safeguards only bypassed under strict 
controls, including compensating measures and time 
Frequent bypassing of instrumented safeguards 
with little oversight, time limits, or risk 




limits. Note: Bypasses include operator bypasses, 
manual operation, changing setpoints, and forces. 
assessment. Note: Bypasses include operator 
bypasses, manual operation, changing 
setpoints, and forces. 
Low tolerance for poor instrument reliability. Proactive 
attitude to taking action to improve reliability. 
High tolerance for poor instrument reliability. 
Unresolved issues, long-term out-service, and 




Minimal false or spurious alarms 
Many false or spurious alarms or alarms 
ignored or disabled 
Instrumented safeguards are known to be reliable and 
effective 
Instrumented safeguards are known to be 
unreliable or ineffective 
Identified failures are investigated and repaired in a 
timely manner 
Failed equipment remains in-service; repeated 
failures are not investigated 
Failure reporting and escalation notification for 
unresolved issues is clearly defined 
No/poor reporting structure for identified 
failures; no escalation of unresolved problems 
 
 
Table 2. Workplace Practices 
 
Topic Positive Human Factors Negative Human Factors 
Maintenance Instructions 
Task complexity 
Required tasks are well-defined and regularly 
performed 
Infrequently performed or repeated/rapid 
changes in task expectations 
Manufacturer installation and maintenance manuals are 
reviewed to ensure that maintenance procedures agree 
with intended application; manuals are accurately 
translated, written in native language and  written from 
the perspective of the maintenance technician 
Manufacturer installation and maintenance 
manuals are not reviewed for consistency with 
application; manuals are not clearly written, in 
wrong language, or poorly translated 
Units of measure are consistent between provided 
documents and equipment configuration 
Units of measure are not consistent between 






Procedures include verification of installation and 
configuration of instrumented safeguards against 
specification 
No review of installation and configuration of 
instrumented safeguards after initial validation 
 Installation drawings, specifications, and functional 
requirements are accessible when needed 
Installation drawings, specifications, and 
functional requirements are not accessible 
Procedure 
clarity and detail 
Procedures are at the right level of detail to ensure 
consistent execution and record keeping 
Too general or too detailed leading to 
inconsistent maintenance, a tendency to skip 
steps, or poor maintenance records 
Procedures are written in concise, imperative language Wordy, inconsistent style 
Procedures include notes, cautions, and warnings 
where errors could result in impaired equipment 
Lack of hazard awareness, unknown impact of 
error 
Notes, cautions, and warnings set off from procedural 
steps (e.g., in text boxes placed immediately before 
applicable steps) 
Task criticality not clearly identified 
Procedures/checklists used in the performance of task Task sequence done by memory 
Procedures contain clear pass/fail criteria 
Maintenance determines acceptability based on 




Maintenance procedures include return to service 
verification by operations 
No operations cross-checking or verification of 
return to service for instrumented safeguards 
Topic Positive Human Factors Negative Human Factors 
Change 
management 
Procedures address change management and version 
control 
Maintenance corrects problems without 





Procedures include appropriate supervisory checks No supervisory cross-checking or verification 





Instrumented safeguard equipment is easily accessible 
for maintenance or accessibility issues are addressed in 
the maintenance procedures 
Instrumented safeguard equipment is not easily 
accessible; maintenance is known to be delayed 
by access issues 
Maintenance facilities designed for purpose, arranged 
in logical order, easy to use, well-labeled, and in-
service status is easy to detect  
Maintenance facilities are confusing, 
complicated, unreliable, disablement possible 




Table 3. Personnel Traits 





Minimal turnover of maintenance technicians resulting 
in significant experience with site instrumented 
safeguards and a high degree of personal knowledge of 
site systems 
High turnover of maintenance technicians 
resulting in less experience with site 
instrumented safeguards and less personal 
knowledge of site systems 
Hiring qualifications are defined and include specific 
requirements for instrumented safeguards 
Hiring qualifications are not defined or do not 
include specific requirements for instrumented 
safeguards 
Technicians are well-trained, experienced, and good at 
troubleshooting the technologies used on site 
Technicians are not well-trained, are 
inexperienced, or lack troubleshooting skills 
with the technologies used on-site 
Technicians are well-trained on safe work practices, 
such as lock-out/tag-out, electrical safety, job safety 
analysis, etc. 
No specific/unclear requirements for training 
on safe work practices, such as lock-out/tag-
out, electrical safety, job safety analysis, etc. 
Technicians are well-trained on instrumented safeguard 
maintenance and required record keeping. Training 
program includes periodic refresher training. 
No specific/unclear training on instrumented 
safeguard maintenance and record keeping.   
Fatigue 
Overtime limited by defined policy that ensures 
reasonable and regular rest breaks 
Overtime is extreme and does not ensure 
sufficient rest 





Training verification includes both test and 
observations 






Table 4. Enabling Conditions 




Required PPE does not affect performance of tasks 




Test equipment is high quality, equipment calibration is 
verified 




Noise level low enough to easily communicate  
Hearing protection is required. Noise level 
hinders ability to hear or use communication 
equipment. 
Provided with protection from weather; including rain, 
snow, wind, and sun 
Not provided with protection from weather, 
including rain, snow, wind, and sun 
Task conducted in climate-controlled environment 
Task conducted in high temperature and/or 
humidity extremes 
Clear visibility where task is being executed 
Poor visibility where task is being conducted, 
including fog, smoke, or other sight obscuring 
element 
Lighting is sufficient to conduct task, including being 
able to read tags, critical information, procedures, or 
other documents 
Lighting is insufficient to conduct task or to 
read documents 
Housekeeping 
Equipment is clearly and uniformly labeled Equipment is mislabeled or not labeled 
Equipment is installed in the field as would be 
expected (A to C are upstream to downstream) 
Equipment is installed in an unexpected order 
(C to A are upstream to downstream) 
Equipment criticality is easily distinguished in the 
documents and in the field 
Similar equipment in same area or grouped 
together without any indication of criticality 
Clearly communicated identifier/location for 
instrumented safeguard equipment 
Ambiguous identifier/location for instrumented 
safeguard equipment 
Consistent tagging between procedures, P&IDs, and 
equipment 
Inconsistent tagging between installation and 
documents 
Installation shows discipline toward good labeling, 
tight wiring connections, and consistent installation 
practices 
Installation shows poor discipline, such as 
loose wiring connections, lack of consistent 
labeling, or inconsistent installation practices 
Time pressure 
Number of tasks well-matched to work force Required tasks exceed resources 
Pace of tasks is not rushed. Little time pressure on step 
execution. 
Multiple tasks are executed in rapid succession 
and under time pressure 
 
